Following the seminal work of Wierzbicka (1985 Wierzbicka ( , 2013 , this paper proposes and discusses a set of semantic analyses of words from three different levels of the English ethnozoological taxonomic hierarchy (Berlin 1992): creature (unique beginner), bird, fish, snake, and animal (life-form level), dog and kangaroo (generic level). The analytical framework is the Natural Semantic Metalanguage approach (Wierzbicka 1996 , 2014 , Goddard and Wierzbicka 2014 . Though ultimately resting on the foundational elements of the NSM system, i.e. 65 semantic primes and their inherent grammar of combination, the analysis relies on the analytical concepts of semantic molecules and semantic templates (Goddard 2012 (Goddard , 2016 . These provide mechanisms for encapsulating semantic complexity and for modelling relations between successive layers of the hierarchy. Other issues considered include the extent to which cultural components feature in the semantics of ethnozoological categories, and the extent to which semantic knowledge may vary across different speech communities.
Framework
The analytical framework is the Natural Semantic Metalanguage approach (Wierzbicka 1996, Goddard and Wierzbicka 2014) , a system of meaning representation based on a small inventory of fundamental, indefinable elements of meaning: semantic primes. They are listed in Appendix A using English exponents. Comparable lists exist for about 30 languages.
Semantic primes have an inherent syntax which allows them to be combined into phrases, sentences and texts. Evidence suggests that this syntax is language-independent, in the sense that the same combinations can be realised in all or most languages. As well as simple combinatorial possibilities (e.g. 'something good/bad', 'in many places'), semantic primes can have extended valency and complement options. Language-specific variant forms or "allolexes", and portmanteau expressions, are also allowed, e.g. English else for other, often for 'at many times'. Together, semantic primes and their associated grammar make up the core of the Natural Semantic Metalanguage. In addition to semantic primes, many explications require the use of various semantic molecules Wierzbicka 2014, Goddard 2016) . These are complex meanings, themselves definable in terms of semantic primes, that function alongside primes as building blocks of linguistic meaning. They are marked with [m] to distinguish them from semantic primes. Cross-linguistic research indicates that semantic primes, and many important semantic molecules, are expressible lexically in all or most languages 1 .
Using this metalanguage allows researchers to decompose complex languagespecific meanings into text-like configurations (semantic explications) of simple crosstranslatable concepts. Explications for a given semantic subclass typically follow a consistent semantic template, i.e. the content is arranged into sections that appear in a logical sequence. The role of each section is indicated by labels on the right-hand side, but these are not part of the explications proper.
Preview
To present seven complex explications in the space available, it is necessary to confine the discussion and justification to key points. By way of overview, it will be helpful to make three general comments. First, even though in most cases I have been able to build on previous work, (re)formulating each one of these explications has been an arduous process. Most have presented numerous puzzles of expression connected with the challenge of capturing intricacies of meaning using a very small metalanguage.
A second issue (or pair of issues) concerns the optimal selection of semantic molecules and the structure of the semantic templates. I want to flag that I am proposing a new solution to a paradox concerning the role of 'animal [m] ' as a semantic molecule of English. The paradox arises because from the intuitive point of view of an English speaker, dogs, horses, kangaroos, and so on, are clearly categorised as animals; and yet it is well-known that the meaning of this English word is rather language-specific. If 'animal [m] ' is used as a taxonomic head, as it was in Goddard (2011) , the implication is that the English-language conceptualisation of all the lower-level generic words is significantly different to that of closely related European languages. On the other hand, if 'living thing' or 'creature [m] ' is used as the top-level taxonomic head and 'animal [m] ' is omitted altogether, the explications seem to be missing an important element. Briefly, the solution proposed here is to include 'animals [m]', but not as a taxonomic head.
Third, there is the long-recognised issue of how much semantic detail deserves to be included in an explication (the "what's in, what's out?" question) , and, relatedly, the question as to how much semantic variation there can be across English-speaking communities and between individuals. Wierzbicka (1985) distinguished between what she termed "concept maximum" and "concept minimum". The "concept maximum" designates what competent adult speakers know in virtue of knowing the language well, as evidenced by phraseology and collocation: a linguistically scaffolded, shared stereotype. It may include cultural knowledge and culturally-conditioned construals. The "concept minimum" can be thought of as the minimum collection of features that a person needs to know in order to recognise a given creature as an instance of, say, the category dog, horse, or kangaroo. I accept the usefulness of this distinction, and in this study I am generally out to capture the concept maximum. Notwithstanding, however, it seems clear that for some words, speakers of some varieties of English have richer semantic entries than others because they have richer shared understandings of the concept in question. To open up this issue, section 5 considers two generic-level concepts which differ markedly in this respect: dogs and kangaroos. Section 6 is a concluding discussion.
A UNIQUE BEGINNER: 'CREATURE'
It can be hypothesised that all or most languages share a rather simple "unique beginner" in the ethnozoological domain, explicated in [A] below. This explication is simpler than the version presented in Goddard (2011) .
[A] creatures something living something like this can move something like this can feel something
It must be admitted that the universality of this meaning has not yet been thoroughly tested and the picture is complicated, in some languages, by polysemy and other language-specific factors.
In Russian, the closest equivalent is (zhivye) sushchestva '(living) creatures' 2 , in Polish stworzenia. In German Tier(e) is probably the preferred equivalent. Though normally translated as 'animal(s)', it is much broader in its range of application and can be used freely about birds, insects, snails, and so on. For French, the best candidate is probably bête, for similar reasons. Both German Tier(e) and French bête(s) are likely to be polysemous, as suggested by the fact that bête, for example, normally suggests a large creature 3 . As an example of a different kind of polysemy, in the Australian Aboriginal language Warlpiri the equivalent meaning appears to be expressible by the polysemous word kuyu, which also can have the narrower meaning 'edible creature, game', as well as 'meat'. Kuyu in both these narrower senses can apply equally well to all edible creatures, including birds, lizards and snakes. Both meanings are very frequent and salient but a broader meaning is also attested, for example, in the title of the Warlpiri booklet Kuyu Ngarninja-wangu ("Kuyu we do not eat") by Robertson George Jampijinpa (1980) . Whether this broader meaning is precisely identical to 'creature' requires further research, but it seems clear that they are substantially equivalent.
LIFE-FORM WORDS
It is arguable that all or most languages have taxonomic heads comparable in meaning to 'birds' and 'fish'. To say this is not to claim that such words are absolute universals (cf. Goddard 2018: 57-59), because it is well established in the linguistic and anthropological literature that such words can differ in their range of application, especially in relation to large flightless birds and bats.
2 Sushchestva can also be understood as 'beings', consistent with its morphological makeup, though clearly it would not make sense to speak of a fish or snail as a 'being'. Together with the fact that sushchestva can be used about people, e.g. pisateli -eto verkhovnye sushchestva 'writersthey are supreme beings', and about 'extraterrestrial beings' vnezemnye sushchestva, this indicates that sushchestva is polysemous between 'creatures' and 'beings'. The adjective zhivye 'living' serves to "select" the 'creature' meaning.
3 All three languages also have other, more abstract-sounding and/or technical words, e.g. Russian sozdanie, tvorenie, tvar', French animal, créatures, German Lebewesen, but these are not preferred candidates in view of the existence of "plainer" and more stylistically versatile alternatives. ', used in section (b) , are given in Appendix B. Needless to say, to avoid circularity, they are phrased without reference to birds. The third line of section (b) is phrased to allow for the existence of flightless birds, while acknowledging that birds are commonly thought of as being able to fly. Sections (c) and (d) capture, respectively, diversity in the range of places where birds live and where they are commonly found, and in their sizes. Provision for a range of habitats and sizes is typical for major life-form concepts.
Birds
In section (e), Body, the various parts of the bird's body design are described as being like human body-parts, such as 'head' and 'legs'. This detail of wording is necessary because the explications for 'head' and 'legs', and so on, are based explicitly on people's bodies (Wierzbicka 2007) . Section (f), Behaviour, provides for the existence of flightless birds, as well as saying something about what birds eat. Section (g), Sounds, is an important part of the bird concept, since many birds make distinctive speciesspecific sounds which are often pleasant to the ear. In connection with this last point, we can note the English use of the verb sing about birds, and expressions such as bird song and song birds; on the other hand, some birds, such as crows and parrots, are not said to 'sing', but to chirp, screech, caw, etc.
[ Nothing has been included in explication [B] about nests, but probably this should be added.
Fish
The explication in [C] follows the same template as used for birds, except that two sections, Behaviour and Sounds, are omitted, and there is a final section 'Relation to People', which indicates the existence of fishing as a human activity.
Here are a few selective comments. In the final line of section (b), the word 'swim' has been avoided, since it is well known that in many languages one does not speak about fish "swimming". In section (c), it is assumed that 'sea [m]' is a widespread "approximate" semantic molecule. In the Body section, nothing is said about there being two kinds of bodies, i.e. male and female. In fact, fish bodies do come in two types but the differences are difficult to discern, and, in my view, do not form part of the general concept of fish. An issue which is open for discussion is whether there should be an additional 'How People Think About Them' section, as proposed in Wierzbicka (1985) . Such a section seems well motivated for many generic-level words, but it is not clear whether the same applies for life-form words. In the case of fish, one candidate for such a section would be a component along the following lines: 'when something bad happens to their bodies, they don't feel something bad like people feel something when something bad happens to people's bodies'. This would capture an apparently widespread folk belief that fish do not feel pain.
Minor life-form words
Not all life-form concepts are as complex as 'fish' and 'birds', or as prolific as taxonomic heads; and not all have equal claim to the status of approximate or nearuniversals. On the contrary, it appears that languages may possess various minor, less well differentiated, life-forms (cf. Atran 2000) . Consider the English word snakes. There are some primary lexemes for individual kinds of snake, e.g. python, viper, cobra, and (in Australia) death adder and taipan, but people are well aware that there are many other kinds which go unnamed. A tentative explication is given in [D] .
[ Spider deserves to be recognized as another minor life-form word of English, given the existence of primary lexemes like tarantula, daddy long-legs, and, in Australia, red back, funnel-web, and huntsman.
Languages vary in the number and semantic composition of these minor categories, and in whether or not they function as taxonomic heads. For example, Polish grzyby, the near-equivalent of 'mushroom', functions as a taxonomic head in words for various kinds of mushrooms, such as kurki, maślaki, koźlaki, prawdziwki, borowiki, rydze, pieczarki, and muchomory (Wierzbicka 2009 ).
ANIMALS
Explication [E] below is based on that presented in Wierzbicka (2013 (Goddard 2017) .
Second, in section (b), there is an immediate physical comparison with people: 'their bodies are like people's bodies, not like the bodies of creatures [m] of many other kinds'. As we will see, throughout the explication there is a series of alignments and contrasts with the concept of people. This may seem unexceptional but not all languages do this -not even all European languages. As mentioned, if we compare English animals with its nearest counterpart in German, we see that German Tiere (singular: Tier) embraces a much broader range of creatures. Fish, birds, snakes, and even spiders and insects, can be regarded as Tiere (and likewise, in Danish, as dyr) .
In section (c), 'Where They Live', we can see other components that help delimit the concept of animals. They are said to live in 'places where parts of their bodies can often touch the ground [m] '. This serves to exclude fish and other aquatic creatures, but it does not exclude tree-dwelling creatures such as squirrels and monkeys. Living on land, squirrels and monkeys can still often be in contact with the ground, even though they spend much of their time in the trees. Skipping down to section (g), the last two components provide for the existence of numerous wild animals, and also for a number of animal kinds that live in association with people.
A couple of further points follow. In section (d), the Body section, it is stated that many animals have two legs at the front and two at the back (this wording allows for exceptions such as kangaroos and chimpanzees). Section (e), 'Male and Female', says that their bodies come in two kinds, one with some parts 'like parts of women's [m] bodies' and the other with some parts 'like parts of men's [m] bodies'. The comparison with people continues in section (f), in relation to how animals are 'born [m]' and cared for after birth.
Finally, there is a section 'How People Think About Them', which sums up people's ambivalent attitudes towards animals: recognising that they can do many things and feel many things, but equally that they lack human capacity for knowledge, speech and thought, and in particular that they lack any "sense of right and wrong" ('they can't think like this about something: 'it will be good if I do this, it will be bad if I do this'); cf. words and expressions such as animalistic, like an animal, they behaved like animals, and the like.
[ at the same time, people can think about them like this: "they can't know many things like people know many things they can't say something with words like people can say something with words they can't think like people can think, they can't think like this about something: 'it will be good if I do this, it will be bad if I do this'"
GENERIC-LEVEL WORDS
As mentioned, Goddard (2011) had proposed that in English the word 'animal' functions as a taxonomic head in the explications for individual species words such as dog, cat, mouse, and so on. This proposal brought with it certain difficulties, however, because it seems counter-intuitive to say that the semantics of English dog and German Hund, for example, are different at the very highest level of categorisation. The present paper proposes an alternative strategy, according to which 'animal [m]' does appear in the explication of dog and kangaroo -though not as a taxonomic head. Wierzbicka (1985) explicated many generic-level terms, including dogs, cats, horses, cows, tigers, squirrels, foxes, wolves, lions, and elephants, among others. See Goddard (2011) for more recent explications of cats, mice, and rats. As noted by Wierzbicka (1985) , people's general knowledge about an animal species greatly depends on its role in human life: expressions such as domestic animals, farm animals, zoo animals and wild animals reflecting different domains and degrees of contact.
The template used below follows Wierzbicka (1985 Wierzbicka ( , 2013 with the following sections (except that with dogs, there is a special 'Exceptional Relation With People' section inserted in second position): Category, Where They Live, Size, Body, Sounds, Behavior, Relation to People, How People Think About Them. One open question is whether the final section deserves to be included or whether it should be dealt with as a cultural script; see end of section 5.1.
Dogs
Explication [F] is one of the longest and most complex of all generic-level explications, which is only to be expected, given that dogs are the most familiar of all domestic animals. Indeed, it is believed that they co-evolved with humans from wolf-like ancestors, this accounting for their highly developed social cognition (Hare, et al. 2002) . Dogs also come close to being a "universal animal", in the sense of being known by the vast majority of the world's cultures, albeit with differing roles and cultural attitudes. Here we focus on dogs as they are seen in the Anglo English linguaculture.
The phraseology associated with dogs is extensive, including body-parts and endonyms, vocalisations, stage of life, words related to keeping and looking after dogs, compounds related to "working dogs", commands, breeds (specifics), cousin species, and numerous sayings and proverbs. Space prohibits reviewing these in any detail here. There are many aspects of explication [F] that warrant discussion. Space permits only five observations at this point. First, the explication asserts "canine exceptionalism" from the onset, in sections (a) and (b), and this is elaborated in great detail in the lengthy section (g) 'Relation to People'. Second, the Size and Body sections, (c) and (d) respectively, provide for a great deal of diversity. Third, section (e) attempts to capture some of the complexities of dog sounds, in particular, the "messages' expressed (or thought to be expressed) by barking and by growling. The existence of howling (whimpering, etc.) is also briefly alluded to. Fourth, the Behaviour section (f) includes not only some typical behaviours and abilities of dogs, but also their tail wagging and their sense of smell. Fifth, the 'Relation to People' section (g) is extensive, including their role as pets and companions, the special relationship that dogs can have with their owner or master, their territoriality (though possibly this should be positioned under Behaviour), and how they can help people in many tasks. The possibility of people mistreating dogs is also mentioned. I reserve discussion of the final section (h) until after the explication.
Along with the astonishing degree of semantic detail, a striking feature of the explication is how frequently it attributes human-like capacities of thinking (and even, saying) to dogs, albeit the model thoughts are short and context-bound.
[ of all these kinds like this: ...'). This is a minor, and presumably innocuous, difference due to the different structure of generic-level, as opposed to life-form, concepts. Second, there is the more problematical issue of how to capture the idea that dogs can be thought of as sexually loose, i.e. indiscriminate in their mating, as well as sometimes engaging in other potentially disgusting bodily behaviours, e.g. licking or sniffing each other's genitals. The idea behind the component is to indicate the general nature of such behaviours without going into too much detail.
A final and more general question is whether a 'How People Think About Them' section deserves to be included in the semantic explication at all. An alternative approach would be to represent the same content using a kind of cultural script (Goddard 2009 , Wierzbicka 2015 . Cultural scripts, briefly, are the NSM mechanism for representing social attitudes and norms, especially concerning ways of speaking, thinking and acting. They typically begin with a component like: 'many people think like this: ....' or 'people often think about it like this: ....'. To depict commonly-held attitudes about dogs and other species, the following framing components might work: it is like this:
when people think about dogs, they often think like this: ... "....
...." many people know this
This issue is not a simple one and it is not possible to explore all the ramifications and possibilities here. Whatever the appropriate mechanism for capturing cultural attitudes towards dogs (or any other species), it is clear that they can differ widely across cultures and thus must be captured as part of any comprehensive ethnolinguistic description.
Kangaroos
From an ethnosemantic point of view, kangaroos contrast with dogs in many ways. They are little known by personal contact to English speakers outside Australia, but are widely known by reputation, as it were. Kangaroo was one of the earliest loan words into English from an Australian Aboriginal language, the Guugu Yimidhirr language of north Queensland (Haviland 1977) . It was first recorded by the botanist Joseph Banks during Captain Cook's 1770 voyage to Australia, and on account of the strangeness of the animal (to Europeans), the word kangaroo quickly became internationally well-known.
Kangaroos are well represented in films, television, books, toys and souvenirs around the world. They are strongly associated with Australia, and indeed, the kangaroo is a symbol of Australia. There is a kangaroo on the Australian coat of arms (along with an emu), a kangaroo in motion is the logo of the national airline Qantas, and numerous Australian sporting mascots and other logos feature kangaroos. Visitors to Australia will find a kangaroo (a small group of them) on the $1 coin. Figure 1 shows some visual images that are familiar to most Australians.
The phraseology associated with kangaroos is not as varied as that for dogs, which of course makes sense given that kangaroos are wild animals. With the exception of pouch, and possibly joey (young kangaroo), much of it is not widely known outside Australia. In Australia, kangaroos are often called roos. They are very common, so much so that on many country roads people worry about hitting a roo (hence the value of having a roo bar fitted to your car). "Kangaroo crossing" road signs are common. The form -roos is used in the names or nicknames of national sports teams, such as the socceroos and hockeyroos (men's soccer and women's field hockey teams, respectively) and jillaroos, the national women's rugby team. In Australia, most people would be familiar with the collective noun mob, referring to a group of kangaroos (often 6-10, or more, in number).
Kangaroo meat (roo meat) is available in many supermarkets. People know that kangaroos are not farmed and that kangaroo meat is obtained from commercial shooting of wild kangaroos. The collocations roo shooter and roo shooting are well attested (also kangaroo hunting, kangaroo hunter, and less so the term kangaroo harvest). Kangaroos are also shot as a population control measure on farms and in national parks, a controversial practice known as kangaroo culling (also, the kangaroo cull). At the bottom right is an advertising still for a 2018 movie "Kangaroo". Note the small figure of the roo shooter in the background Explication [G] is intended to capture the "concept maximum" of kangaroo in Australian English, supported by the linguistic and other evidence summarized above. How much of this semantic content is shared across English speakers will be discussed in section 6.
A few observations follow. In relation to section (a), it is interesting to note that in reality "the kangaroo" is not a single species at all. There are several distinct species of kangaroo, and as well there are wallabies, which are smaller but have a similar body shape (they are all technically macropods). Nonetheless, from the semantic-conceptual point of view of Anglo Australians, kangaroos are 'creatures [m] of one kind'.
Section (b) is notable for including the country word 'Australia [m]' as a semantic molecule in the 'Where They Live' section. It is more usual to find words for "habitat zones", such as 'jungle' or 'desert', in this section (or expressions like 'places where there is a lot of snow'), though presumably 'Africa [m]' appears as a molecule in English words like lion and giraffe. As it happens, there are a large number of species endemic to Australia, and some of them, such as koala, dingo, and platypus, are part of the everyday, non-specialist lexicon. As with kangaroos, there would be a case for including 'Australia [m]' in explications for these words; cf. also Bromhead (2011) on the Australian English sense of 'the bush'.
The idea behind section (c) is that the Size component depends on comparison with the human body, but the exact wording is open to question. It would be possible to use the expression 'someone's body', but intuitively this sounds vague, even odd, and allows the unwanted possibility that the 'someone' could be a child. The solution adopted here is to make the comparison with a 'man's [m] body'. Needless to say, it gives one pause to think that the implicitly anthropocentric standard of comparison may be "crypto-gendered".
The Body section (d) is detailed, with attention paid to the unusual non-quadrapedal body, the long feet, long tail, typically upright stance, and so on. The description of the legs as 'strong [m]' echoes the common expression "powerful hind legs" and in relation to the feet it is interesting to note the Latin name for the genus, i.e. macropod, literally, 'large foot'. The internal ordering in this section, i.e. with legs coming first, is motivated by its conceptual prominence against the prototypical four-legged "model animal". It should also be noted that the Marsupial aspects of the kangaroo's body (pouch, etc.) are not included here but are given in a separate section: section (g). This is because these components seem to require coordinated use of "body" and "behavior" components, on account of the relationship between 'pouch' and 'joey'.
The Sounds (e) section of the template is empty. In section (f), the words 'jump' and 'hop' have not been used, even though they are commonly used to describe the kangaroo's mode of locomotion. There are three reasons: first, the basic sense of 'jump' is a single action in one place, which creates problems with using it as a molecule to describe repeated actions; second, it would be hard to choose between 'jump' and 'hop'; third, to describe the "bounding" forward motion requires such an amount of additional detail that there is little to be gained by employing 'jump' or 'hop' as molecules.
As mentioned the "marsupial" aspects of the explication, essentially, the distinctive 'pouch' of the female kangaroo, and its role in sheltering and nurturing the young 'joey', are dealt with in section (g). Some aspects of this section are no doubt unknown to many English speakers outside Australia, and probably to some Australians as well. Note that the word 'pouch' is included, not as a molecule but as a name: 'it is called [m] a pouch'.
The Relation to People section (h) deals with kangaroos as a source of meat, and with the fact that they are hunted and 'culled'. The final 'How People Think About Them' section attempts to capture the role of kangaroos as an international symbol of Australia: 'when people in many countries [m] Needless to say, there are many facts about kangaroos which are not mentioned in this explication; for example, the use of the tail in pushing forward while grazing and hopping, the fact that kangaroos have claws, that there is a notable size differences between male and female, that Aboriginal people hunt kangaroos for meat and many other purposes. I have tried to stick to aspects which are well supported by linguistic evidence.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The present study has sought to revisit Wierzbicka's (1985) ground-breaking explorations into the semantics of words for natural kinds, and to update and augment her many insights from the perspective of the NSM approach in its current stage of development, more than three decades later.
The most striking claim remains that it is indeed possible to explicate the conceptual content of natural kind terms, given detailed attention to linguistic evidence, but that such explications are astonishingly complex -both in their sheer length (typically 30-40 lines of semantic text) and in the number of semantic molecules involved (more than 50 unique molecules in this study alone). Many of the semantic molecules required for ethnozoological concepts are not specific to this domain, e.g. words for body-parts, physical qualities, environmental words, some action and activity verbs, but others are: specifically, the higher-level categories such as 'creatures', 'animals', 'birds', and 'fish'.
The present study has focused on the English language, while acknowledging that the near-equivalents of most of the words explicated, including those designating higherlevel categories, vary across languages.
Clearly, semantic templates play an indispensable role in disciplining the vast semantic complexity of ethnozoological concepts. The templates, shared by numerous words from the same domain, provide a stable frame (like a questionnaire or checklist, Wierzbicka 1985: 192) which can be filled out and elaborated over childhood as one acquires more and more knowledge and integrates it into the updated cognitive model. The template concept helps us understand how one's model of an unfamiliar species may have "placeholder" sections which are very sketchy or even blank, and -evidentlythere can be variation between speech communities, and, presumably, even between individual speakers of a single language. The idea of "concept maximum" and "concept minimum" are useful constructs to help support discussion of such variation.
It must be remembered that the extent to which a speech community or individual approaches the concept maximum for a given species does not depend only, or even mainly, on their personal contact with the species in question. In many cases, the great majority of one's semantic knowledge is linguistically mediated, i.e. acquired from discourse. Yet the volume, detail and character of discourse about animals differs according to physical, environmental and cultural setting. In Australia, for example, kangaroos feature in discourse to a much greater extent than say, badgers or beavers, though the opposite would be the case in England or Canada, respectively. As Wierzbicka (1985: 223) put it: "having said all this I feel it should be admitted that folk names of biological genera ... do seem to be more subject to interpersonal variation than nearly all other kinds of concepts encoded in natural language". Notes: -Exponents of primes can be polysemous, i.e. they can have other meanings in addition to the semantically primitive meaning -Exponents of primes may be words, bound morphemes, or phrasemes -They can be formally complex -They can have language-specific combinatorial variants or "allolexes" (indicated with ~) -Each prime has well-specified syntactic (combinatorial) properties.
